appellants is that they had delayed in lodging the application to set aside the judgment, which judgment was regularly obtained. I hereby reproduce what the Learned Registrar had said in his ruling:
"On the question of delay, it appears that the defendant was jolted into action after being visited by the sheriffs. Otherwise it is clear that it had a claim in the High Court hanging in their heads. The question is whether despite the fact that the defendants have a defence on the merits, I should still set aside the judgment after such a delay, a delay of about 2 months.
In my view, the defendants should not be rewarded for their lax approach in this matter when they clearly knew that they had a defence especially when the so called lay persons acknowledged in OM1 that they knew what was required of them after the writ of summons had been served on them.
I dismiss the defendant's application with costs on account of their delaying to have the regular judgment set aside."
It is therefore clear that the only issue for my determination relates to whether the delay of about 2 months would really amount to inordinate or inexcusable delay.
I have looked at several case authorities in this area. I am in the first place aware that an application to set aside a default judgment should be made promptly and within a reasonable time as is stipulated in note 13/9/12 (1999 Rules of Supreme Court). As to what is a reasonable period will depend on the circumstances of each and every case. In the case of Nico General Insurance vs Thomas Mwanyimbiri MSCA and Appeal NO 54 of 2008 (unreported), the court held that a period of 5 months delay before bringing the application to set aside default judgment was inordinate and inexcusable. In the case of John G. Kawamba t/a Central Associates Limited vs W.T.C. Freight Limited Civil Cause NO 541 and 542 of 1986, HC PR, it was held that 6 months delay after the default judgment had been entered was inexcusable.
I have looked at the case at hand. It is a case which also touches on the employment status of the plaintiff. I hold the view that merit of defence should