IN THE MALAWI SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL SITTING AT BLANTYRE

Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 1 of 2020

(Being High Court of Malawi, Principal Registry, Civil Cause No. 14 of 2016)

Between:

Barnet Nansongole.....Applicant

And

National Bank of Malawi Plc.....Respondent

Coram: Honourable Justice A.C. Chipeta SC, JA
Chayekha, of Counsel for the Applicant
Mwangomba, of Counsel for the Respondent
Minikwa, Court Clerk

RULING

I am glad that the lamentations I expressed in **Simama General Dealers Company Limited vs Smallholder Farmers Fertilizer Revolving Fund of Malawi** on 8th September, 2020, which I christened as Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 35 of 2020 from MSCA Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2020, have very readily been understood and put to use. Quite appropriately, the

application before me was on 10th September, 2020 registered as a miscellaneous application, and not either as an appeal, or as an application in an appeal. The situation on the ground is that the applicant has in the matter he is concerned with not yet lodged any appeal to this Court. He run out of time for doing so quite some time back, and he is now looking for the *fiat* of this Court if he is to gain the ability to appeal. Thus, if he secures that *fiat* he will, in the absence of any other hindrance, be in a position to appeal, but if the *fiat* is withheld he will not manage to appeal. Most regrettably, in the past applications like this and appeals as well as applications in appeals, were all treated as one and the same thing. They were being mixed up in a single register and they all went by the appeal case number they were registered under. I say all this just to express the relief I feel following the registry's speedy action on the lamentations I raised in rectifying the error.

Barnet Nansongole is the applicant in this application. He has based it on Section 23(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act (Cap 3:01) of the Laws of Malawi. Following Honourable Judge Kenyatta Nyirenda's judgment of 15th May, 2018 in the matter he took up in the Court below, and by mandate of the said Judge, an Assistant Registrar assessed the damages that were due to the applicant in it on 24th June, 2019. He, however, delayed in taking the decision to appeal against the Order that had been pronounced. By the time he was deciding to question certain aspects of the assessment order, he was outside the time limit the law allows for appeals to be taken up against such orders. Realizing his, the applicant on 2nd August, 2019 made an application to secure additional time within which he could appeal, but he lodged that application in the High Court, which is a wrong forum. That Court has no business with extensions of time for appealing under mandate of Section 23(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act. In due course, with the High Court not attending to his unqualified application, the applicant withdrew it. It is

then that he has lately filed the present application in this Court. He, in it, seeks the Court's indulgence to accord him extended time within which he can appeal against the Assistant Registrar's order on assessment of damages.

Just in passing, and purely by way of observation, I would like to say that the applicant would have done well in the instant application if in tabulating the law that supports his application he had not limited himself to citation of Section 23(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act in the summons that he filed. He could as well have enriched his reference in the heading of his application by at the same time additionally referring to Section 7 of the same Act and to Order III rule 4 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules. Doing so, in my view, would have far more clearly identified (a) the point that his application is a matter for the attention of a single Judge of this Court, and (b) the point that there is in place a set procedure by which applications of this type must abide if they are to succeed. I am well aware that in his skeleton arguments the applicant has alluded to more than just Section 23(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act, but the point at which parties must strive to convince the Court that it has jurisdiction over the matter they have brought to it is on the face of the application as they present it, not at the point of arguing the application whether orally or through skeleton arguments.

In line with what I have seen, the second point I wish to advert to, again in *obiter,* is the question whether when a party is appealing, or intending to appeal, against an order made in Chambers by a High Court Registrar he is or he is not at law under obligation to seek leave to appeal from any Court. I very well know that for now this question might sound academic, since no such question has been posed before me by anyone of the parties to the matter. I mention it merely to sound a caution just in case leave to appeal is a legal requirement. Should it be, and if the applicant has not yet made any efforts to secure it, he might end up finding it

blocking him from appealing even if the present application for extension of time within which to appeal happens to be successful. The long and short of my observation is that an order extending time within which to appeal is a separate and distinct order from one granting leave to appeal in scenarios that require both these orders.

Reverting to the application, I notice that on filing it was supported by a sworn statement, which has four exhibits. Following its service on the respondent, the latter filed a sworn statement and skeleton arguments in opposition to it. It is following this development that the applicant then filed his skeleton arguments in support of his application herein for extended time within which to appeal.

I heard the parties in the application on 21st September, 2020. Today I rule on it. My observation is that Section 23(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act is the correct parent legal provision for the application that has been tabled before the Court. It, in my assessment, is a liberal provision in that in apart makes it plain that litigants who have overshot the prescribed time limits for appealing can apply for extended time, while at the same time making it clear that the freedom to so apply continues even after the time for appealing has actually already expired.

I have also earlier on observed that an application for extension of time is a clear signal that there is no appeal in place. Thus, if Section 23(2) gives the jurisdiction to extend time for appealing to this Court, it can only be that this jurisdiction is exercisable in the context of Section 7 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act. Extending time within which to appeal being neither a hearing nor a determination of an appeal, it of necessity follows that the jurisdiction over such type of application rests with a single Judge of this Court. That is the reason I earlier on suggested that the applicant should have found it important to associate his application with that legal provision.

As for Order III rule 4 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules, which I also suggested that the applicant should have co-opted into his arsenal of legal provisions that buttress his application, its importance lies in the fact that it spells out in very clear language what details an applicant for extension of time to appeal must feature if he is to convince the Court that he is on the right path with his application. *Per* this provision, it is not enough for an applicant to depose in an affidavit about *good* and *substantial* reasons for his failure to appeal within the prescribed time. In the said deposition he ought also to furnish to the Court grounds of appeal that *prima facie* show good cause why the appeal he intends to take up should be heard.

Now, even though I am duty bound to bear all these other legal provisions in mind when deciding an application founded on Section 23(2) herein since I have no choice but to decide it according to law, I must emphasize the point that it would have been best if the applicant had taken it to be his duty to lay these legal provisions bear upfront before me so and to point me into their direction right on the face of his summons, and not just through skeleton and oral arguments as he did.

With the entire body of law as just highlighted at the back of my mind, the summary of the facts this law should be applied to is that the Registrar's Order on Assessment of Damages, which the applicant is desirous of appealing against, is dated 24th June, 2019. From that time, whatever else the applicant has so far done in pursuit of his desire to appeal, his one and only legally valid application for an extension of time within which to so appeal has, however, only been filed with this Court on 10th September, 2020. If, thus, it be taken that the applicant had six weeks only within which to timeously appeal against the order in question, then what it means is that his legitimate time for appealing must have expired as far back as within the first week of August, 2019. It is undoubted, therefore, that the applicant is not only indeed out of time for appealing, but that he is actually far out of time. Certainly from the

first week of August, 2019 to 10th September, 2020, a period of a whole year and one month, cannot by any stretch of imagination be described as a slight delay. Be this as it may, Section 23(2) herein is generous as it accommodates applications like this one, which come well after the expiry of the period of time for appealing. What is crucial, however, is that, regardless of the duration of his delay under Order III rule 4 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules an applicant for an extension of time must be prepared enough to satisfy both limbs of a two-prong test the law has provided if he is to succeed.

In its opposition against the application the point the respondent has, through paragraph 5 of its adopted sworn statement, put at the centre of its arguments is that the applicant has failed to show to this Court any *good* and *substantial* reasons to warrant the extension of time he is asking for. Indeed, on this single reason, *via* paragraph 6 of the same sworn statement, the respondent prays that the application for extension of time herein be dismissed, and that it be so dismissed with costs.

In the skeleton arguments it filed to back up this stand, which arguments the respondent also duly adopted, the argument advanced is to the effect that according to **Re Five Arbitrators** [1923-60] ALR Mal 431, the limitation of the time within which an appeal can be lodged is a right that is given to the party in whose favour the judgment stands, and that such right ought therefore not be taken away on flimsy grounds. Hence, it was contended, the requirement in Order III rule 4 herein for *good* and *substantial* reasons to be given by an applicant in explanation of its failure to appeal within the prescribed time. Most unfortunately, however, my copy of the 1923-1960 volume of African Law Reports does not contain the case of **Re Five Arbitrators** on the page cited. That case is actually reported from page 435 of that Law Report. On the same point, the respondent has further made reference to **Tratsel Supplies Ltd vs Mwakawanga**, whose citation it has given as (Supra), even though

there is no earlier mention of that case authority in these skeleton arguments. The reason for alluding to that authority, the respondent asserts, is that it was the interpretation of a single Judge of this Court therein that proffering good and substantial reasons means giving reasons that are sound and satisfactory.

It is the position of the respondent in this application that the applicant has not given any logical and convincing reason(s) why he could in this case not have filed his appeal within the time prescribed by the law. In its view, inadvertence on the applicant's part is not a good reason. Beyond this, the respondent has also argued that the applicant's delay in filing notice of appeal in this matter is substantial, and that the grounds of appeal he intends to rely on in the appeal he wishes to take up are frivolous and vexatious as they appear to attack the Registrar's assessment on heads that were not within the ambit of the orders the Judge made.

In contrast with the stand the respondent has taken, as already earlier captured in this ruling, the applicant has through his sworn statement and exhibits confessed all the errors he has committed since August, 2019 in his frantic efforts to obtain an extension of time for appealing in this matter. By exhibit "CMC 1" he has shown that the Assistant Registrar's order on assessment was indeed issued on 24th June, 2019. By exhibit "CMC 2" he has shown that on 2nd August, 2019 he filed in the High Court a notice of appeal containing five grounds of appeal. While at it, let me here hasten to comment on the respondent's statement to the effect that the law does not allow a party who is out of time to file an appeal before he has obtained an extension of time. I think the respondent is correct in this observation, but not on the basis of the authority of **State vs Director of State Residences and others *ex-parte* Banda** [2011] MLR 401 from which he has taken a quotation from page 405 of the Law Report. To begin with that case is on the subject of leave to appeal. It is not on the subject of extension of time within which to

appeal, which is a totally different legal process. Secondly, a look at the rules points towards the conclusion that it is incorrect in cases of leave to appeal to conclude that filing notice of appeal before grant of leave to appeal is *per se* irregular.

A look at the *proviso* to Order III rule 3(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Rules, will clearly show and confirm that there is no prohibition against a party who needs leave to appeal, if he so pleases, filing his notice of appeal in Court prior to his obtaining of the requisite leave to appeal. As such, the case authority cited does not support the proposition for which it has been cited it for. This notwithstanding, I still agree with the respondent's argument to the effect that a party cannot file a valid notice of appeal when his time for doing so has expired and before he has obtained the requisite extension of time order. I say so because in Section 23 of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act or in any other relevant legislation there is no equivalent of the *proviso* to Order III rule 3(2) above-referred. Surely, therefore, if the legislature had intended that in cases of applications for extension of time to appeal too applicants should have the capacity to file notices of appeal in advance of obtaining the required extended time, then it should have said so in like clear language as it has done through the *proviso* to Order III rule 3(2) in matters of leave to appeal.

Be this as it may, therefore, even though it must be correct that exhibit "CMC 2" was a void *ab initio* notice of appeal right from the moment it was filed, the fact that in terms of Section 23(2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act an application for an extension of time within which to appeal can be made at any time, whether before or after the expiry of time prescribed for so appealing, what it means is that once granted extended time even on a very late application, if the full test under the rules is satisfied, there would be no barrier against the applicant filing a fresh notice of appeal in lieu of the invalid one. Thus, the advance filing of the exhibit "CMC 2" notice of appeal ought not to prejudice the applicant in

this application if he otherwise qualifies for an extension of time on a rigorous application of Order III rule 4 herein.

Going on with an examination of the applicant's depositions he has, through exhibit "CMC 3", confirmed that he made a commonsense, rather than a legal decision, to apply for an extension of time for appealing in the High Court because he was of the view that the matter was not yet in the Supreme Court of Appeal. Next, *via* exhibit "CMC 4" the applicant confirms withdrawing the application he had so erroneous filed in the High Court instead of in this Court after wasting so many months waiting and hoping that the High Court would attend to it. The date on this exhibit is 7th September, 2020, which means it took the applicant more than a year and a month to realize and accept that he had lodged his application in a Court without jurisdiction over it.

In his skeleton arguments, the applicant joins the respondent in recognizing Order III rule 4 above-cited as the foundation of the two-legged test he must endeavour to satisfy if he is to be granted extended time for appealing by this Court. In this regard he further cites the case authorities of **Thusita Perera vs Leasing and Finance Company Limited, M. Kaporo t/a Meks Variety Centre and Colombo Agencies** (MSCA) [2007] MLR 412 and **Chiume vs Attorney General** [2000-2001] MLR 102 in support. Through the **Thusita** case, the applicant has captured a dictum the Court in that case quoted from **Attorney General vs Chihana** MSCA Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2000 in which great emphasis was laid on the discretion the Court enjoys in applications for extension of time. The said quotation is also to the effect that unwarranted interference with the Court's discretion in such applications could constitute a violation of a party's right to access justice and lead to the protection of erroneous judgments and unmerited claims that might put the administration of justice into disrepute. After next citing a number of cases in which periods of thirteen months, three months, and five months were held to amount to inordinate delay in applications for extended time for

appealing, the applicant reverted to the **Chiume** case, where after emphatically pointing out that an applicant must give an acceptable explanation for his delay in appealing before the Court can extend his time to appeal, the Court is quoted as having added the statement: *" If there is no acceptable explanation the Court must consider the issue of whether prejudice was likely to occur."*

In praying for the extension of time herein the applicant has thus first appealed to the discretion it contends the law gives to the Court in the determination of such applications. He has further contended that in addition to the conditions Order III rule 4 prescribes for such applications, the court must also consider (a) whether or not there has been inordinate delay in applying for extension of time, and (b) whether prejudice will be caused by such an application. Building on this, he has argued that with his already filed notice of appeal, the respondent has always been aware of what grounds of appeal will constitute the appeal he intends to bring up, and that the said grounds are capable of succeeding. He adds that the respondent has not indicated any prejudice it will suffer if time for appealing is extended. He then says that the reason for delaying in appealing, *"per the sworn statement"*, is that the applicant only had knowledge of the judgment to be appealed against after the time allowed for appealing had elapsed, and so he was unable to give timely instructions to his lawyers to appeal against it. With due respect, I think it pertinent here to point out that, as was well observed by the respondent, the reason the applicant has given here, to wit, that instructions to appeal were could not have been given before the time for appealing had elapsed is not *"per the sworn statement... "* as represented by him. The truth of the matter is that there is no such deposition in the sworn statement that was filed in support of this application.

I incidentally do recall that by way of trying to explain himself out of this observation, the applicant said that this statement was to be found in

the sworn statement that he filed in support of the application he filed in the High Court. I am of the clear mind that this is a lame excuse or lame explanation. To begin with, in my understanding of paragraph 5 of his sworn statement in support, the applicant exhibited "CMC 3" not as an application and sworn statement to be used by this Court in determining this application, but merely to show that on 2nd August, 2019 he made a mistaken attempt in applying for an extension of time, which he filed in a Court other than this one. Actually, as can be easily confirmed, in part the summons the applicant has filed in this Court reads: *"Take notice that the sworn statement of Charles Mlozeni chayekha will be relied on in support of this application."* There is no mention anywhere in that summons of any further notice from the applicant to suggest that in the prosecution of his application in this Court he will also be relying on a sworn statement he earlier filed in the High Court, which forms part of exhibit "CMC 3".

Secondly, as already indicated above, the application in respect of which the sworn statement in question was filed in support was an invalid application in the sense that it was filed in a Court that had no jurisdiction to deal with matters of extension of time for appealing. Based on Section 23 (2) of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act as the applicant's said application was, only a little investigation of that Act on his part could have shown the applicant that he was clearly off track in reasoning that because the matter had not yet reached the Supreme Court of Appeal he could then borrow provisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal Act for use by the High Court in his application. Right from the outset, the preamble to that Act indicates that its provisions are in respect of the constitution of the *Supreme Court of Appeal,* its jurisdiction, its procedure, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. How the applicant ended up following a hunch that Section 23(2) of this Act would authorize the High Court to exercise Supreme Court of Appeal jurisdiction in matters of extension of time and sticking to that belief from August 2019 to September, 2020 instead of checking on what the

law provides in the circumstances, strikes me as being quite naive and unreasonable of him. For him then to expect that this Court would go out of its way to peruse an invalid application and its invalid sworn statement for purposes of supplying gaps in the reasons the applicant has supplied in the sworn statement he has filed in this Court just to find an explanation of his delay in applying for an extension of time is, therefore, totally out of the question.

Additionally, it will be seen that much as the applicant clung to his erroneous application in the High Court for tiresomely long, he eventually came to his senses and saw the futility of hoping that somehow the High Court would find reason for exercising jurisdiction that belongs to the Supreme Court of appeal, and he thus withdrew it. I would therefore really find it strange in the circumstances that the applicant would see nothing wrong with this Court searching for reasons for his delay in appealing from a sworn statement he himself realized to be invalid and withdrew from the Court, all in a bid to beef up his chances of showing to this Court that he has *good* and *substantial* reasons for taking so long without legally putting in an application for extended time. In my judgment, it follows from the above analysis that the applicant cannot rely on the contents of an invalid and withdrawn sworn statement that was erroneously directed at the High Court to fish out supplementary reasons that he has left out at the time of filing the present application to explain his thirteen months' delay in coming up with this legally valid application for extension of time to appeal.

Having this far sufficiently discussed the arguments the parties have traded in this application, it is my view that on what is cardinal in applications such as the present one, the parties are at *ad idem* with each other. They are both agreed that for a Court to extend time for any party to appeal once the prescribed time for doing so has lapsed, Order III rule 4 above-cited is central on what an applicant must show to the Court if he is to succeed in his application. The way I comprehend this provision,

in dealing with applications of this type, as a Court I must first address my mind to the question whether there are *good* and *substantial* reasons to explain the applicant's failure to appeal within the time set by the law, before I can concern myself with the equally important question whether from the intended grounds of appeal I see a *prima facie* good cause why the intended appeal should be given a chance to be heard. To me, therefore, only if the applicant herein ends up successful on the first limb of the test will it be necessary for me to go further and look at the reasonableness of giving the intended appeal a chance of being heard. I so conclude because for the application to succeed the applicant needs to satisfy me on both limbs. If he fails on the first it would automatically follow that having a *prima facie* good cause why the appeal should be heard, if at all he has such a cause, would not be enough to salvage his application from failing.

I must begin, therefore, with the question whether the applicant has in this application managed to give me *good* and *substantial* reasons for his failure to properly and legally apply for an extension of time within which to appeal from the first week of August, 2019 to 10th September, 2020. My answer to this is clearly in the negative. He fumbled from the word go. He founded his initial attempt to apply for an extension of time within which to appeal by resorting to logic rather than by resorting to the law as would have been expected. It is significant that the said law is plain and unambiguous about what application to make, how to make it, and in which forum to make it. In so trusting his senses more than trusting what the law would have told him had he spared a moment to read it and reflect on it, the applicant shot himself in the foot. He certainly, therefore, did not have a *good* and *substantial* reason for neglecting the law and going by what he felt the law probably provided or should have provided at the time. I equally do not see the making of such a mistake in taking his said application to the High Court, instead of to this Court, as a *good* and *substantial* reason for explaining this delay. I have already rejected his claim through skeleton arguments that for no fault of his he

delayed in giving instructions to his lawyers to appeal in this matter. He has brought that assertion up through testimony *via* skeleton arguments when the sworn statement he filed before the Court for purposes of supporting the application has no such deposition. All in all, therefore, the applicant has completely failed to satisfy me on the first limb of the test.

As for the second limb of the test for obtaining extended time for appealing, in view of the applicant's failure to provide me with *good* and *substantial* reasons explaining his delay, it matters not whether he has reason to succeed on this limb of the test. Whatever might be his fate on it, the test being a two-prong one, he cannot succeed in his application after failing on the first limb. *Vis-à-vis* that limb of the test, however, a concern I have is whether in terms of the law it can be said that the applicant has properly set forth before me grounds of appeal that *prima facie* show a good cause why the appeal the applicant intends should be heard. As happens to be the case the only grounds of appeal I have come across are in exhibit "CMC 2" a notice of appeal that could not have been legally filed with the Court and which should therefore not have been so filed. The question I am laboring with is whether exhibiting an invalidly filed notice of appeal with acknowledgment by the applicant that he filed it out of time and before he had obtained any extension of time for appealing is, under Order III rule 4, an acceptable way of furnishing me with such grounds of appeal.

It may well be, therefore, that I should not even look at these grounds which are in this invalidly filed document the applicant has exhibited. As will be recalled, I have earlier on in this ruling agreed with the respondent's observation to the effect that the law does not allow a party who is out of time to file an appeal before he has obtained an extension of time. In case I be mistaken in my concerns about using the applicant's exhibit "CMC 2" to evaluate what would probably be the grounds of appeal in the intended appeal, and if the parties must know

how I view the applicant's efforts through those grounds in his desire to show me that he has a *prima facie* good cause why the appeal he intends should be heard, then without prejudice to how the full Court would evaluate the intended grounds of appeal that are in question, all I can say is that I do not share in the applicant's hopes of high prospects of success of his intended appeal. Thus, even on this limb of the test, if I had to address it without any misgivings, I would have been inclined to hold that the applicant has not satisfied me with any *prima facie* good cause why I should give his intended appeal a chance to be heard.

As for the applicant's assertion that the Court has a discretion in the determination of such applications, which should not be unduly interfered with, all I can agree with in that argument is that indeed such discretion exists, but that it is circumscribed within the conditions Order III rule 4 prescribes. As well acknowledged by both the parties, the Court needs to be satisfied on the pre-conditions this Order and rule have set before it can extend time. In that provision, as I have earlier observed, there is no limitation of the time, whether under Section 23(2) of the Act or under Order III rule 4 of this Court's rules, within which a defaulting party can take up an application for extension of time to appeal once it has expired. In my judgment, therefore, concerns of whether the delay is short or it is inordinate are a creature of the Courts, and not of legislation. The way I see the law, it does not matter how long or how short the delay in applying for an extension of time to appeal is. If the applicant can show *good* and *substantial* reasons for such, and if he can at the same time also show *prima facie* good cause why his intended appeal should be heard, he must be given extended time for appealing. Likewise, it is my understanding of the law that even if the delay in applying for an extension of time is short, if the applicant fails to explain it with *good* and *substantial* reasons, then whether or not he has *prima facie* good cause for demanding that his appeal should be heard, the Court should not grant him extended time for appealing.

Again here my view is that the question whether or not the adverse party will be prejudiced by an application for an extension of time within which to appeal is a creature of convenience that has been created by the Courts, and not by the law. As can be seen, just as the word *'inordinate'* is nowhere to be seen either in Section 23 (2) of the Act or in Order III rule 4 of this court's rules, so also is the word *'prejudice'* nowhere to be seen in those legal provisions. These words or these tests only feature in Court judgments and how they cropped in is a mystery. They are, therefore, extra tests that the Courts have somehow managed to insert into the law that didn't include them in the first place. I must say that in thus adding to, or substituting, the test Order III rule 4 has set for an applicant to satisfy a Court on before he can get an extension, the Courts have diluted that provision. They have from the blues judicially legislated for loopholes that can be used to accommodate applications they find themselves still sympathizing with even after such applications have fallen short of satisfying the legally prescribed and already existing two-prong test Order III rule 4 clearly articulates. To be quite candid, I do not see what would justify the Courts into reading into this Order and rule words or tests that are not there, and that must be taken not to have been intended to be there – *expression unius est exclusio alterius.*

Accordingly, when we put aside the extra Court-created tests, we remain with the unadulterated and sufficient test the law has already put in place. On this test, which should be the only test for measuring the qualification of an applicant for a Court-sanctioned extension of time to appeal, as I have already held principally on account of the applicant's failure to show me *good* and *substantial* reasons why he delayed to appeal in the prescribed time, my judgment is to dismiss his summons herein to extend his time for appealing. As also seen, however, at secondary level, if I had to get to that, it would have remained my judgment to dismiss this application on the basis of my not seeing any *prima facie* good cause why the intended appeal should be given a chance to be heard if the grounds of appeal furnished through an invalid

document are usable. In the net result I hereby dismiss the application for extension of time within which the applicant can appeal, and I do so with costs.

I order accordingly.

Made in Chambers (*Open Court per Covid-19 Judiciary measures*) the 30th day of September, 2020 at Blantyre

A.C. Chipeta SC
JUSTICE OF APPEAL